Chapter 4: The Joint Strike Fighter: a case study
The announcement when it finally came, on 20 November 2008, was short and sweet: “The Minister of Defence recommends that the F-16 is replaced by the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).” In June 2009 negotiations started on the purchase of up to 56 Lockheed Martin F-35As, a process that was expected to take two years. It had been a topic of often heated debate since at least 2002, when Norway officially joined the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of the multinational JSF project. By early 2007, not quite five years later, the government had decided to sign up for the production and support phase – while still leaving open the question as to which of three fighters to buy as replacement for its ageing fleet of F-16s: the American Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II (i.e., the JSF), the SAAB JAS-39 Gripen, or the European Eurofighter Typhoon. Even at that late stage, the defence ministry was careful to note that “progress has also been made in the negotiations over development agreements with the two other candidates in the combat aircraft acquisition project” and that Norway would “continue the participation in the JSF programme while maintaining competition between the three contenders”. Well into 2008, the shortlist had been whittled down to two, but a final decision was still pending between the American and Swedish contenders. Announcing the final decision, the ministry said: “The JSF is the only candidate which fulfils all the operational requirements specified by the Norwegian Government and is furthermore offered at a lower price than the [next generation] Gripen.” The Joint Strike Fighter was considered to be “the better of the two candidates regarding intelligence and surveillance, counter air, air interdict and anti-surface warfare”. | ||||
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The F-35: cost and time perspectives alone were daunting.... | ||||
Friends and neighbours The debate over the purchase of new combat aircraft for the Norwegian Armed Forces therefore reflected a kind of strategic “tug-of-love”, which partly explains the great public interest in this particular procurement issue. However, it also serves as a paradigm for the way such decisions are considered and – eventually – made in a military context. For one thing, the cost and time perspectives alone were daunting: whatever the outcome, the decisions would affect Chiefs of Defence, ministers and ministries, state secretaries, Air Force Generals and a great many others for decades to come. If manned aircraft are at all relevant by then, the next similar round can hardly be expected before somewhere around the middle of the century. The emphasis in such circumstances has to be on the future, not the past. Although it is important to learn from history, any decision must be based firmly in the 21st century, based on what Norwegians will be doing, not on what they used to do. This principle has an impact on defence procurement policy, foreign and security policy, and industrial policy. A major defence purchase is – by its very nature and size – a major catalyst initiating a cascade of changes throughout the nation and often beyond. All the more important, then, to strive for a systematic, balanced process, based on transparency and competition. Addressing a seminar on the subject at the Oslo Military Society, Espen Barth Eide, State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, asked rhetorically: Why does Norway need combat aircraft at all? “Our part of the world is characterized by peace and stability”, he said. “Our region is perceived as safe and free from military threats. Norway remains committed to an UN-led world order, based on a solid foundation of international law. Why then do we need a modern combat aircraft capability? Is this a contradiction, a paradox?” Arguing that we were now entering the “post-post 9/11” era, the speaker pointed to repercussions affecting not only far-away theatres, but also our economic and security environment at home. “Predicting the future is difficult, and therefore flexibility is paramount. Another question is where in the spectrum from ‘low end’ to ‘high end’ should we aim for?” Considerable thought, not least within NATO, has been given to the future of armed forces in an international context. Generally speaking, armed forces are becoming more specialized, and not all can have – or want to have – combat aircraft. As Norway’s participation in international operations is always in collaboration with other allies and partners international operations alone are no argument for maintaining a modern combat aircraft capability. For example, Norway could focus more exclusively on providing ground troops for international operations, or at least another line of defence investments than the high-tech air and naval platforms that the government is currently pursuing. However, Norway faces a unique set of challenges close to home which are very different from those facing almost any other European country – particularly as regards the High North, Norway’s number one strategic priority. This region is unique in its bearing on Norwegian long-term interests and international responsibilities. One reason is the region’s considerable energy resources. The global demand for oil and gas is has become an explosive international and economic issue, and major powers like the US and the EU are looking more anxiously at potential competitors for limited supplies of energy, as new forces to reckon with – with economies that are growing very rapidly indeed – jockey for position in the global arena. Moreover, Norway is perceived as a stable and reliable supplier of energy compared with many other oil and gas regions. However, the environment and the natural resources in the region must be seen as a whole. For example, the region is home to large and important fish stocks, and these must be managed in a cautious and sustainable manner. Although most of the challenges and much of the potential in the High North concern environmental, economic and civilian issues, this does not mean that a military presence is irrelevant. On the contrary: it is the need to safeguard Norwegian interests in a long-term perspective that dictates a strong military presence in the northern parts of its territory. This is an important political signal – both inside and outside the country’s borders. It is a signal to other countries, to companies, and to Norway’s own population. | ||||
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Uniflote equipment during NATO winter exercise Cold Response 2009 | ||||
High-end capabilities
The need to maintain a strong and flexible military capability and the need to focus on Norway’s responsibility in the High North were core considerations when the government finally approved in principle the combat aircraft acquisition. The process then moved on to choosing which aircraft, and how many. This is one of the biggest-ever Norwegian investments, and the choice was not easy. All three original contenders were top-shelf candidates offering modern and future-oriented platforms. Nor were there security policy obstacles to any of the candidates. On the contrary, there were strong strategic arguments for all of them. Moreover, they were all NATO-compatible and would be in use by other allies, something which was an absolute requirement for the government. When combat aircraft are in action, things happen very fast, and it is vital that Norway’s future combat aircraft have the ability to operate integrated with her allies and partners and to engage in high-intensity operations, both in Norway and in international operations. The most important criterion for the selection of future combat aircraft is the ability to solve the tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the main focus must be to secure the best capability for Norway’s Armed Forces. The chosen aircraft must be a useful tool for contributing to secure Norwegian interests. In these terms, all three candidates were good candidates. Industrial packages Despite the past year’s turmoil in global financial markets, Norway’s economy remains sound and unemployment low. The government aims to build on this advantageous financial position so as to prepare Norwegian industry for a future beyond the oil and gas era, for different economic times. Putting it mildly, a vital high-tech defence industry can play a constructive role in such a future: all the more so because the defence sector is one of the few areas where Norway is exempt from WTO and EEA regulation, and where the state therefore can play a more active role. The ultimate aim is to secure a role for a competitive Norwegian defence industry in an increasingly international market. On a ten-year view, the acquisition of new combat aircraft will place a heavy burden on Norway’s defence investment budget. For at least a decade, it will be very difficult to find room for other major investments in the defence sector. A development which left the Norwegian defence industry on the back-burner for the next ten years or more would be unacceptable, resulting in the loss of many jobs and weakening the national industrial base. The industrial package, and all it implies, is absolutely essential. A thorough analysis of the industrial plans presented by the candidates concluded that the competitive edge would depend on which industrial package contributed most to the creation of the future industry platform in Norway. It was not the volume so much as the technological value of the package which would be the clincher. | ||||
