Chapter 2: Instability in a global age

Following a relatively peaceful transitional phase after the end of the Cold War, uncertainty and unpredictability are now the order of the day. Terrorist attacks throughout the world, the long-running Afghanistan campaign, war and its bloody aftermath in Iraq, endless unrest in the Middle East... all are characteristic of “an epoch which could be termed the global age” in which “geographical borders no longer afford the same degree of protection against a broad spectrum of security threats and challenges”, the ministry says.

Even pre-9/11, successive governments had become increasingly cognisant of the possibility that conflicts in other regions of the world could spill over into Norway. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the unfolding menace of international terrorism had become modern-day realities that Norway’s defence planners had to contend with. The contrast with the 1990s – which had certainly seen more than enough dramatic changes, particularly on Norway’s eastern flank – could hardly have been more dramatic. But with the end of the Cold War had come an end to the threat of Soviet invasion and an apparent easing of international tensions: albeit a series of new conflicts, notably in the Balkans, was a reminder that peace could not yet be taken for granted, even in Europe.

Still, the new millennium seemed to promise the West a much needed breathing space. Norwegian policy-makers could relax a bit as they prepared to ponder at their leisure the changing world order, and to tinker with their various ideas for reshaping the Armed Forces, in particular a series of long-term restructuring and cost-cutting plans first proposed in 2001.

Freedom of action
That, of course, was the year of 9/11. The defence minister of the day, Bjørn Tore Godal, argued early in the year that a reorganization of the Armed Forces was necessary even in an apparently “threat-free” period because “we have no guarantee that today’s relatively stable situation will continue in the longer term” and “a central aim must therefore be to ensure freedom of action for the Armed Forces in the long term”.

He continued: “Norway’s defence structure has consisted of relatively large, static forces with a long reaction time. Their task has been to defend the country against a possible massive attack on Norwegian territory. A defence organization based on such a concept, will, however, not be capable of meeting the challenges that we must be prepared to face in the future. “Far-reaching changes are therefore imperative if we are to have a credible defence capability. But the restructuring must yield real improvements and not merely lead to quantitative reductions. Together with our membership in NATO, high quality mobile and flexible forces capable of rapid reaction are our best insurance....”

For the Norwegian defence establishment it is axiomatic that Norway’s defence programme can rely on the continued existence of NATO (which Norway joined in 1949), thus guaranteeing sizeable reinforcements in times of crisis or war. However, the drive towards a new, “lean and mean” Armed Forces is tied in with what planners call the “total defence concept”, which integrates conventional security needs with those of society at large and emphasizes “quality, not quantity”.

Conscription, a fixture in Norway for more than a century, is a good example. The emphasis is increasingly on selectivity, recruiting and retaining the most capable and able-bodied personnel, rather than just filling the quotas.

Multinational cooperation, particularly with the United States and NATO, is seen as means of sharing risks and increasing Norway’s collective security while enabling the Armed Forces to use resources more effectively. The principle applies to any number of areas, from R&D to procurement and logistics and education, training and exercises, as well as operations within common force structures. The overall aim is to further develop Norway’s Armed Forces in an “alliance integrated” direction.

Norwegian M113 armoured personnel carrier on reconnaissance near Kandahar

“Total Defence”
In short, the “hard realities” to which Norway’s Armed Forces must adapt are simply expressed: the end of the Cold War, and with it the luxury of an extensive national defence organization largely paid for by others; the transition from “Napoleon’s legacy” of personnel-intensive massed armies to a capital-intensive modern defence force capable of responding swiftly to recurrent and/or unforeseen emergencies but requiring a huge investment in training and technology – and the resulting need to cut operating costs and streamline the organization.

Interestingly, a similar streamlining exercise – expressed in much the same language – was well underway more than half a century ago, when Norway was invaded by Nazi Germany. The collective memory of 9 April 1940, remains vivid, even if the number of Norwegians with first-hand experience of occupation is dwindling rapidly. The increasing importance of the “total defence concept” can be seen as one way of addressing the issues raised by these memories.

In the traditional view of national security, the Armed Forces have been associated with defence of the state and its vital interests when faced with a serious threat such as invasion, which can also legitimize action involving many or all of the nation’s resources. Political and military pressure brought to bear on Norwegian authorities or through more limited assaults and attacks against Norwegian authorities or interests can also be seen as serious threats to national security.

Clearly, this approach is not really suitable to less conventional threats, where the point is not necessarily to put the nation on a war footing. The security of society, for example, has now become a more prominent consideration than in the past. In addition, a range of risk factors such as the danger from infectious diseases, natural disasters and major accidents have attained heightened significance in the context of national emergency planning.

National security now also involves ensuring the safety of the civilian population and protecting important infrastructure and the main public sector functions against attack or other forms of subversion in situations where the existence of the state as such is not threatened. The guiding principle in working to ensure the security of society is that the authority which has day-to-day responsibility for a particular sector also has responsibility for emergency planning and the implementation where necessary of emergency measures in a crisis situation.

Accordingly, the total defence concept acknowledges the need for mutual support and cooperation between the defence organization, with its military arm, and civil society. The principle of civil-military cooperation means that the whole of society’s resources should, if necessary, be capable of being used in defence of the country, across the whole spectrum of crisis, to deal with immediate or imminent threats to public safety, even in peacetime.

In crisis situations in peacetime, this support will normally take the form of supplementary assistance to the civil authorities when the crisis is of such a nature that the particular authority responsible for that sector is unable to manage the crisis on its own. The assistance provided by the Home Guard in connection with crises and disasters is a typical example of such support; others might include the border guard activities along the Norwegian-Russian border in Finnmark, service units taking part in Search and Rescue Service (SAR) operations, and the part played by the Armed Forces in coastal defence and preparedness.

The greater emphasis on the Armed Forces’ support for the civil community means that it is no longer deemed necessary, for example, to invoke emergency powers legislation, given the close working relationship between military and civil communities in preventive measures, emergency planning and operational matters.

	Gullfaks C, North Sea
	Supreme Allied Command - Transformation (SACT), Norfolk Naval Base, USA

For example, the Norwegian economy is highly dependent on the control and rational use of the vast resources on the Continental Shelf and in Norway’s exclusive economic zone. Oil and gas supplies from Norway are of strategic importance to other states, a situation that ties significant Norwegian interests to developments in the global energy sector and to the interests of other states. Protecting Norway’s oil and gas installations is a vital task which must be undertaken in close cooperation with allies and in line with international regulations that safeguard such interests. The same is the case for international regulations and principles relating to the freedom of the seas and the management of resources in the oceans. The defence of these interests would normally be conducted by other than military means.

Globalization, one of the defining features of our time, has eroded the primacy of the Euro-Atlantic region as the geographic focus of Norwegian security interests. The diminishing importance of geographic distance from potential or actual threats also reduces the relevance of a geographic perspective as a key criterion in security thinking. Developments in international terrorism, cyber warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and long-range weapons systems, and international crime underline the need for a global perspective.

Flexibility the key
In short: “Defence in our time is about being flexible”, in the words of former Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen.“The world is changing. Norway must move on, and so must our Armed Forces.” The Cold War obliged the Norwegian Armed Forces to concentrate their activities at home in view of Norway’s geographical position on NATO’s northern flank. Even though Alliance plans and exercises were based on the insertion of mobile forces in exposed areas, Norwegian defence was essentially static, and Norwegian operations abroad were seen as a mainly supplementary activity.

This is one main reason why the business of modernization has been a more demanding process for the Norwegian Armed Forces than for many of the country’s allies. Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall could Norway’s obligations be viewed in their entirety, against the background of a new and more complex threat picture, in which geographical distances were of less significance and mutual dependence between nations and regions assumed a new importance.

Another need therefore has been to reshape Norwegian military capabilities to include a sharper focus on international operations – the UN’s peace operations are a notable example – and to give priority to the use of Norwegian forces under the auspices of formal multilateral organizations rather than in so-called coalitions of states willing to take part. “This is partly because this will strengthen international efforts to promote security and the international rule of law”, in the ministry’s view. “It is also partly because the political influence of smaller countries like Norway can be exerted to better effect in organizations which have a permanent structure.”

Of course, the Norwegian Armed Forces’ principal raison d’être is not to take part in operations abroad but to secure and defend its homeland. For some time the North has been considered the most strategically important investment area in the foreseeable future. Although the challenges here are largely non-military in nature – oil and gas extraction, transport, the environment and important marine resources – the Armed Forces still have a central role to play, both in a security context and as a part of the community.

Norway’s defence capability in the North comprises three main elements: command and control functions, surveillance, and a credible reaction capability. Contact points between the military and civil society, both public sector and nongovernmental, are many and varied. Coastal emergency planning and response, the Coast Guard, the Home Guard and the rescue services are functions in which the Armed Forces play a major role.

Military bases serve first and foremost as departure points for the Armed Forces’ operations. The government sees the ability to react swiftly to incidents or crises as a priority: operational defence capability as a whole is far more important than the presence of a fixed number of bases, although some degree of concentration of military activities is essential. However, Norway’s military presence in the North does not imply a policy of militarization or confrontation. Common interests with northern neighbours ensure that service personnel are made well aware of the need to be good ambassadors for Norway. 

A need to attract more women to the defence sector: female recruit at Sessvollmoen garrison

In praise of diversity
An important personal goal for the Armed Forces is to reflect the multiethnic and socially diverse nature of modern society To begin with, there is a need to attract more women to the defence sector. Although women have the same rights as men to all positions, both military and civilian, in the Norwegian Armed Forces, the organization is still essentially male dominated. The target is a minimum of 15 per cent women in the ranks and 25 per cent on officer training courses; but in recent years the figure has varied between six and seven per cent. In one call-up in 2008, 182 women applied for officer training; about 60 were found qualified to take the entry tests, but only half of these actually took the exams – a development officials describe as “worrying”.

Similarly, as Norway has become an ethnically multicultural country, ethnic representation in the Armed Forces has failed to keep pace. “We need to draw on the experience and the knowledge which the different cultural groups represent”, the ministry says. “Cultural competence is a central factor for success when international operations are planned and executed. Both at home and abroad our Armed Forces should be a showcase for our democratic political system based on human rights, ethnic diversity and gender equality.” In response to the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, the Norwegian Armed Forces have committed the organization to give priority to a number of measures in addition to the 15 and 25 per cent targets:

• Women are invited to enlist for national service on a voluntary basis.
• Military schools and training institutions will integrate issues related to women, peace and security into basic and specialized training programmes.
• Women leaders are to be promoted as candidates for international military and civilian positions in relevant ministries and in international organizations.
• The Ministry of Defence and the Norwegian Armed Forces are to integrate gender perspectives into the planning of all international activities, including operational plans.
• Norway is to support UN recruitment processes to ensure that more women are appointed to higher positions in peace operations, actively promoting strong candidates for such positions.
• Efforts to ensure that a gender perspective is taken into account in the UN’sintegrated missions.

Among the main themes in the longterm development of the Armed Forces is implementation of the restructuring already underway, with the emphasis on savings in non-operational activities, and political and military planning for the future. Continuing collaboration with allies – Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States in particular – offers the additional benefit of reduced costs both in procurement and in subsequent operation and maintenance. Operational needs remain central – as does the need to take into account the interests of Norwegian industry when formulating defence policy.

Advice and consent
In this context, “Defence Study 07” (FS07), the aim of which is to “enable the Chief of Defence to promote comprehensive and professional military advice for the Minister of Defence and the Government in the period of 2009-2012”, is of crucial importance.

The study, one of the more interesting chapters in the Armed Forces’ long-term (and long-running) restructuring project, proposes “measures for attaining a permanent balance between tasks, structure and resources, protecting operational structure and increasing the efficiency of the support structure”. FS 07 reports to an advisory group appointed by the Chief of Defence, who is also the leader. This group consists of the Chief of Staff, the head of the Defence Department’s division for defence policy and future planning, and the director of the Defence Research Institute.

The cost of the revamped Armed Forces structure is likely to run into the tens of billions annually over the next 20 years. The financial burden will require changes in organization, training and equipment, competence, personnel and future investments. All support structures, logistics and base installations would be accommodated to fit the operational structure. The initial emphasis is on “investigating the opportunities for concentrating operations, expert communities and educational establishments as a preliminary basis for a future defence structure”.

Allowing for reforms in the personnel and educational sector already put into effect, the spotlight is on future personnel requirements and recruitment with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the military schools and revaluating the current arrangements for national service. Multinational cooperation is another major theme, together with related issues of national sovereignty.